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This paper analyses the effects in terms of size and volatility of government revenue and 
spending on growth in OECD and EU countries. The results of the paper suggest that both 
variables are detrimental to growth. In particular, looking more closely at the effect of each 
component of government revenue and spending, the results point out that i) indirect taxes 
(size and volatility); ii) social contributions (size and volatility); iii) government 
consumption (size and volatility); iv) subsidies (size); and v) government investment 
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Non-technical summary 
Public spending is widely seen as having an important role in supporting economic 
growth. On the other hand, a lower level of spending implies that fewer revenues are 
needed to achieve balanced budgets, which means that lower taxes can be levied, therefore 
contributing to stimulate growth and employment. Public spending is a key variable that 
influences the sustainability of public finances via effects on fiscal balances and 
government debt, and this is relevant for the success of common monetary areas such as 
the European Monetary Union. Additionally, in the European Union, the so-called Lisbon 
Agenda also assigned a relevant role to the reform of public finance in order to foster 
economic growth. For those reasons, a firm control and, where appropriate, reduction of 
public expenditure is important and a balance has to be drawn between running down 
public debt, cutting taxes and financing public investment in key areas.  
 
Therefore, in this paper we examined the effect of government size and fiscal volatility on 
growth for a set of OECD and EU countries, from 1970 to 2004. The overall results 
suggest that both dimensions tend to hamper growth in both country samples. Total 
revenue and total expenditure seem to impinge negatively on the real growth of per capita 
GDP both for the OECD and the EU countries. In particular, a percentage point increase in 
the share of total revenue (total expenditure) would decrease output by 0.12 and 0.13 
percentage points respectively for the OECD and for the EU countries. It is worthwhile 
mentioning that the magnitude of the effect is almost identical in absolute terms to the 
effect of total investment (private and public) share on growth. Moreover, total 
expenditure volatility also has a negative and statistically significant effect on growth, at 
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Breaking up total revenue into direct taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions, our 
results suggest that among total revenue the variables that are most detrimental to growth, 
both in terms of size and volatility, are indirect taxes and social contributions. At the same 
time, analysing the components of total spending (transfers, subsidies, government 
consumption and government investment) the results suggest that, while for both set of 
countries both subsidies and government consumption have a significantly negative impact 
on growth, government investment does not significantly affect growth, and transfers have 
a positive and significant effect only for the EU countries. Moreover, for the EU countries, 
public consumption and investment volatility have a sizeable, negative and statistically 
significant effect on growth. These results are also in line with some available related 
empirical evidence pointing to the negative effects on growth of public spending, 
particularly in the case of developed countries. 
 
There are relevant policy implications to be drawn from these results. It seems that revenue 
reductions that occur mainly in terms of indirect taxes and social contributions, and cuts in 
government consumption and subsidies may contribute positively to fostering economic 
growth in the country samples analysed. Moreover, public capital formation may indeed 
turn out to be less productive if devoted to inefficient projects, or if it crowds out private 
investment. These conclusions also provide useful indications to policy makers when 
deciding which components of public finances to adjust (namely by redirecting spending 









Public spending is widely seen as having an important role in supporting economic 
growth. On the other hand, a lower level of spending implies that fewer revenues are 
needed to achieve balanced budgets, which means that lower taxes can be levied, therefore 
contributing to stimulate growth and employment. Public spending is a key variable that 
influences the sustainability of public finances via effects on fiscal balances and 
government debt, and this is relevant for the success of common monetary areas such as 
the European Monetary Union. Additionally, in the European Union, the so-called Lisbon 
Agenda also assigned a relevant role to the reform of public finance in order to foster 
economic growth. For those reasons, a firm control and, where appropriate, reduction of 
public expenditure is important and a balance has to be drawn between running down 
public debt, cutting taxes and financing public investment in key areas.  
 
Moreover, a better control of fiscal variables would eliminate or at least reduce the 
possibility that fiscal policy itself is a source of macroeconomic volatility. In fact, if we 
accept that fiscal policy is in some cases driven by considerations which are not linked to 
macroeconomic stability, then there is the possibility that by limiting such actions the 
society will gain by having less economic volatility (both in terms of output and 
investment) and thereby higher economic growth. Generally speaking, one would like to 
redirect public expenditure towards increasing the importance of capital accumulation – 
both physical and human – and support such areas as research, development, and 
innovation. 
 
However, in order to understand how to restrict fiscal policy volatility and check 
government size, it is particularly important to understand which components of 
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government revenue and spending are most detrimental to growth. In fact, understanding 
the channel through which fiscal policy affects growth can help us to understand how to 
redirect public spending and revenue, and which components should be limited. Therefore, 
in the main contributions of the paper we provide some answers to this composition issue, 
and we address the effects of both government size and fiscal policy volatility on 
economic growth using the volatility of the cyclical components of the budgetary 
variables. Moreover, we also look into several budgetary revenue components in our 
analysis, something seldom done in the literature.  
 
We analyse, for a set of OECD and a subset of EU countries, from 1970 to 2004, the effect 
of total public revenue and expenditure and of their components on growth. In particular, 
for each of these components we consider two measures of fiscal activity: the relative size 
of each fiscal variable as a percentage of GDP, and business cycle volatility. The results of 
the paper suggest that for several components of general government revenue and 
spending both size and volatility measures have a negative effect on growth, and that 
restrictions on these variables should be seen as favourable.  
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section Two we position our paper 
in the related existing literature. In Section Three we explain our methodology. In Section 
Four we present the empirical analysis and discuss its results. Section Five summarises the 
paper’s main findings and provides some policy implications. 
 
2. Motivation and Literature 
One of the frequently quoted stylised facts of public sector economics is that of “Wagner’s 
Law” about the long-run tendency for public expenditure to grow relative to some national 
9
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income aggregate such as GDP.1 This implies that public expenditure can be treated as an 
outcome, or an endogenous factor, rather than a cause of growth in national income. On 
the other hand, Keynesian propositions treat public expenditure as an exogenous factor, 
which could be utilised as a policy instrument. In the former approach, the causality runs 
from national income to public expenditure whereas in the latter proposition, causality runs 
from public expenditure via domestic demand to national income. Evidence concerning 
this topic is not conclusive.2 
 
Additionally, Lucas (1988) argues that public investment in education increases the level 
of human capital and this can be seen as a main source of long-run economic growth. 
Moreover, Barro (1990) mentions the importance of government expenditure in public 
infrastructure for economic growth and Romer (1990) stresses the relevance of research 
and development expenditure. Therefore, composition of public spending is also a relevant 
issue, and if the aim is to promote growth, the focus should be put on the more productive 
items of the budget, even if the balance between the various functional items of the budget 
can vary according to the particular circumstances and priorities of each country.3 
 
The increase in total expenditure in most developed countries (see Table 1 for an 
illustration) must be seen against a background where governments gradually tried to fulfil 
“Musgravian” goals: macroeconomic stabilization, income redistribution, and more 
efficient resource allocation. In fact, it was during the 1970s and 1980s that most European 
                                                          
1 Adolf Wagner formulated in the 19th century a “law” regarding the expansion of government. Based on the 
data he had he argued that as the wealth of society increases, so does the size of government.  
2 A number of time series empirical studies have in the past found support for the so-called Wagner’s Law. 
These, however, might not be reliable due to measurement errors and because they did not employ co-
integration tests to establish stationarity  in the relevant variables (see for example, Peacock and Wiseman 
(1961), Musgrave (1969), Bird (1971) and Beck (1982)). More recent work seems to point to the existence of 
a positive relation between per capita income and public spending (see Martinez-Mongay (2002)). 
3 For a survey on fiscal policy and economic growth see Zagler and Durnecker (2003), while Hemming, Kell 
and Mahfouz (2002) review the effectiveness of fiscal policy in economic activity. 
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countries increased the coverage of social benefits such as unemployment insurance. In 
addition, pension benefits related to public pension insurance were also reinforced in the 
1970s and in the 1980s. On the other hand, from Table 1 from 1995 onwards expenditure 
ratios declined in most countries in order to contain rising public debt ratios. 
[Insert Table 1] 
 
Some increase in the size of the public sector is to be expected when taking into account  
past rising population and also to meet the broadening requirements of the welfare state in 
most countries. However, a larger public sector, as measured here by the share of 
government expenditures in GDP, does not necessarily imply a better satisfaction of public 
requirements or, for that matter, a more efficient approach to providing the minimum 
required benefits of the welfare state.4  
 
Fiscal volatility is another important issue regarding fiscal policy and its effect on growth. 
From a theoretical point of view, restrictions on government expenditure volatility may 
have both positive and negative effects on long-run growth. A crucial variable to 
determine the sign of these effects is business-cycle volatility.5 On the one hand, since 
governments can smooth out business-cycle fluctuations by the use of discretionary 
changes in fiscal policy and by the use of automatic stabilisers6, fiscal policy may 
positively affect private investment and long-run growth. On the other hand, fiscal policy 
itself might be a source of business-cycle fluctuations and exacerbate macroeconomic 
volatility, e. g. in case of pro-cyclical measures. 
                                                          
4 Afonso, Schuknecht and Tanzi (2005) report that so-called “big governments” seem to perform less 
efficiently than “smaller governments.” See also Afonso et al. (2005) for a discussion on spending 
composition and growth. 
5 In fact, as documented by several studies, business-cycle volatility is harmful for growth and its 
determinants. See, for example, Altman (1992, 1995), Aghion et al. (2005), Fatás (2002) and Furceri 
(2007a), Ramey and Ramey (1995). 
6 See, for example, Sachs and Sala-i-Martin (1991), Bayoumi and Masson (1995), Asdrubali, Sorensen and 
Yosha (1996), von Hagen (1998), Afonso and Furceri (2007). 
11
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Several papers have looked at the specific mechanism through which fiscal policy can 
affect business cycles. Most of these papers have analysed the effects of government 
expenditure restrictions on the ability to smooth economic fluctuations. For example, 
Roubini and Sachs (1989), Alt and Lowry (1994), Poterba (1995), Levinson (1998) and 
Lane (2003) show that restrictions on government expenditure, and thus lower government 
expenditure volatility, result in a slower adjustment of the economy to unexpected shocks. 
However, other papers that have directly addressed the effects of fiscal restrictions on the 
volatility of business cycles provide contradictory results. For example, Alesina and 
Bayoumi (1996) show that fiscal policy restrictions tend to have a negligible effect on 
business cycles, and they argue that the positive and negative effects discussed above 
cancel each other out.7 In addition, Canova and Pappa (2005) show, for the US states, that 
the presence of tighter budget constraints, debt related or institutional restrictions, does not 
appear to matter much for business cycle fluctuations.  
 
In contrast, Fatás and Mihov (2006) illustrate that although the two effects are statistically 
significant, the first effect predominates. In particular, Fatás and Mihov (2003) show that 
the volatility of output caused by discretionary changes in fiscal policy lowers economic 
growth by more than 0.8 percentage points for every percentage point increase in 
volatility. However, it is important to stress that not only discretionary changes but also 
transitory (and cyclical) changes in fiscal policy may increase output volatility and thereby 
reduce output growth. In fact, as has been suggested by Ayagari, Christiano and 
Eichenbaum (1992), temporary changes in fiscal policy may have a significant impact on 
                                                          
7 For instance, a report from the EC (2007) on the euro area mentions that fiscal criteria and the Stability and 
Growth Pact have dampened growth volatility in European and Monetary Union (EMU). 
12
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interest rate volatility and this, in turn, will reduce long-run growth.8 To this point, Furceri 
(2007b) analyzing a panel of 99 countries from 1970-2000, shows that a 1 percent increase 
in government expenditure business cycle volatility determines a decrease of 0.78 
percentage points in the long-run rate of growth.  
 
However, although the effect of government expenditure volatility has been widely 
analysed, the effect of volatility in the components of public spending and revenue has not 
so far been widely addressed in the literature.9 This paper tries to fill this gap. In particular, 
it analyses the effect on growth of several government spending and revenue items, both in 
terms of government size and volatility.  
 
3. Methodology 
Several studies in the growth literature have found a negative bivariate relationship 
between growth and the measure of government size.10 It is well known that the inclusion 
of particular control variables in a growth regression can wipe out this bivariate 
relationship (e.g., Easterly and Rebelo, 1993). Thus, it is necessary to consider which 
information to include in such growth regressions as control variables. Sala-i-Martin 
(1997) running two million regressions found 60 variables to be significant in at least one 
growth regression. In a more robust analysis, Levine and Renelt (1992), applying the 
Extreme Bound Analysis initially proposed by Leamer (1983), found robust cross-country 
growth correlates to be: (i) the average investment share of GDP; (ii) the initial log of GDP 
per capita; (iii) initial human capital; and (iv) the average growth rate of the population. 
The initial level of GDP is not only a robust and significant variable for growth (in terms 
                                                          
8 For example, Bernanke (1983), Pindyck and Solimano (1993), and Blackburn and Varvarigos (2005) show 
that in models with investment irreversibility and financial frictions, higher uncertainty regarding investment 
prices will determine a lower level of investment and growth. 
9 Some examples of somewhat similar analysis are provided by Brunetti (1998) and Gong and Zou (2002). 
10 See Plosser (1993).  
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of conditional convergence, Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 1995), but output is generally 
correlated with tax revenues and government expenditure.  
 
Openness is another variable found to be significant in many cross-country growth 
regressions, moreover it is somewhat related to fiscal policy. In fact, if open economies are 
especially exposed to shocks, as argued by Rodrick (1998), it may be especially important 
for the government to facilitate private consumption smoothing by operating a 
countercyclical policy. On the other hand, integrated international financial markets may 
offer more scope to absorb shock through risk sharing, suggesting there is less need for 
government to step in. 
 
In the same way output volatility (defined as the standard deviation of output business 
cycle) has been found to negatively affect growth (e.g. Ramey and Ramey, 1995) and is 
usually correlated with government expenditure volatility (e.g. Zimmerman, 1995; Lane, 
2003; Fatás and Mihov, 2006). Moreover, since volatility of government expenditure is a 
combination of output volatility and policy measures, we need to consider output volatility 
in order to identify the effect of government expenditure volatility on growth. 
 
Thus, in order to take into account robustly the determinants of growth, and to control 
simultaneity between growth and government size, and growth and fiscal volatility, in our 
empirical model we include in addition to the fiscal variables the initial log of GDP per 
capita 0Y ,  the average total investment share of GDP (I/Y),  initial human capital h , 
the average growth rate of the population n , openness OPEN , and output 
14
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11 We also include a country dummy for Germany and Finland to account 
for breaks, and a year dummy for EMU and the EU single market (SM), to see if EMU and 
the creation of the single market were important determinants for growth among the EMU 
and EU countries, respectively.12 
 
Another relevant issue to be discussed using cross-country growth regression is the time 
span to be used. Usually studies in the growth literature make use of large time spans (30-
40 years) and consider the average value of growth determinants over this time period. 
However, when fiscal and other policy variables are included, this could raise several 
problems, such as endogeneity and significant simultaneity. In particular, regarding fiscal 
policy, over long time spans the level of government spending and income are likely to be 
influenced by demographics, in particular an increasing share of elderly people. Thus, 
errors in the growth variable will affect GDP, demographics, and taxes or government 
spending. As a result, the independent variables, government revenue or government 
spending as a share of GDP, are correlated with the error term in the growth regression, 
and this will produce biased estimates. 
 
A second problem is that such cross-section studies, using long observation periods, give 
rise to an endogenous selection of fiscal policy13. For instance, over a long time span 
growth is likely to influence tax revenues. Countries that initially raise taxes and 
experience lower growth during the observation period are more likely to reduce taxes. In 
a similar way, countries that raise taxes without experiencing a negative growth effect are 
                                                          
11 See Appendix 1 for a detailed descripition on how we construct output and public spending and revenue 
volatility. 
12 Eventually, events such as EMU could also be considered endogenous outcomes of growth. 
13 In order to check for robustnwess of our results,in section 4.3 we address the problem of simultaneity 
using different empirical specifications. 
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more likely to continue having high taxes. This means that cross-section studies over long 
time spans may fail to capture growth causality effects of taxation. 
A third important issue is that growth regressions over long time spans may be inefficient 
since they discard all information on within-country variation both in terms of growth and 
production, and in terms of government size. Moreover, the inclusion of period dummies 
help to control for the fact that most countries experienced a reduction in the growth rate in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Country dummies take into account specific country-effects. 
 
For all those reasons we will focus mainly on combined cross-section time-series 
regressions using seven five-year periods from 1970 to 2004 (e.g. 1970-1974, …, 2000-
2004), and we use pooled country and time fixed effects, and robust standard errors to 
control for heteroscedasticity between countries.  
 
Therefore, we estimate the two following growth equations, respectively for general 
government revenue and expenditure:14 
 
2
, 1 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 , 1 1 ,
R
i t i t i t i t i t t i i tg R R X T S                      (1) 
2
, 2 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 , 2 2 ,
E
i t i t i t i t i t t i i tg E E X T S            (2)  
 
where the index i (i=1, …, 28) denotes the country, the index t (t= 1970-1974, 1975-1979, 
…, 1999-2004) indicates the period, and 1 and 2 stand for the individual effects to be 
estimated for each country i. g is the growth rate of real GDP per capita, R is the set of 
                                                          
14 We analyse two separate sets of equations since revenue and expenditure are usually quite correlated (the 
correlation is 0.91 for total revenue and total spending, but lower for sub-components), and this would create 
serious problems of multicollinaerity and would not allow to identify which expenditure and revenue 
variables (both in terms of share and in terms of volatility) matter for growth. For the complete set of 
correlations between spending and revenue items see Table A3 in Appendix 2. Moreover, at least in terms of 
total expenditure and revenue, one should be aware that symmetric effects for revenue and expenditure could 
be expected if both are linked to economic growth.   
16
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general government revenue variables as percentage of GDP, E is the set of general 
government expenditure variables as percentage of GDP, R  is the vector of revenue 
volatility variables, and E is the vector of expenditure volatility variables. X includes a 
set of control variables (initial level of output per capita, output volatility, investment 
share, human capital, population growth, and openness), and T and S are year and country 
dummies. Additionally, regressions (1) and (2) also include square terms for R and E in 
order to test the possible effect on economic growth of different government sizes. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Data
In this paper we focus on OECD and EU countries. The countries included in the analysis 
are the EU15 members, thereafter indicated as EU (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, and the UK), and for the rest of OECD: Australia, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Iceland, Japan, Korea, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland and 
the United States.   
  
Studying just these two samples of countries offers several advantages. Firstly, a longer 
span of data is available for the OECD and the EU than for a broader set of countries, 
including for instance, developing countries. Secondly, data quality and cross-country 
comparability are also likely to be of a higher standard for the OECD, and this is extremely 
important when we consider the measure of fiscal volatility, since volatility would increase 
in presence of measurement errors. Thirdly, as argued by Grier and Tullock (1989), data 
from the OECD and the rest of the world do not share a common set of coefficients in 
cross-country growth regressions and thus should not be pooled. 
17
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Fiscal data for the general government are obtained from the OECD Economic Outlook 
database (see Appendix 2 for details). For the computation of the volatility measures, all 
fiscal variables are converted into constant prices using the GDP deflator, since we do not 
want to eliminate any growth in government spending that takes the form of an increase in 
the relative price of public sector outputs, and since for most aggregates there is not a well 
defined deflator.  
 
In terms of public spending, we examine the following variables: Total Expenditure (E) 
and its breakdown in Transfers (TRA), Subsidies (SUB), Government Investment (GINV), 
and Government Consumption (GCON). For the latter variable we differentiate also 
between Wage (GWAGE) and Non-Wage components (GNONWAGE). In terms of revenue 
variables we analyse Total Revenue (R), and its main components:  Direct Taxes (DIR), 
Indirect Taxes (IND) and Social Contributions (SOC).  
 
For all these variables we construct two measures. The first is the relative size of each 
variable as a percentage of GDP. The second considers cyclical volatility, which is 
computed as the standard deviation of the cyclical component of each variable.15 In Table 
2 we report the results for the average volatility.  
[Insert Table 2] 
 
Human capital (h) is taken from the Barro-Lee (2001) data set. The rest of the control 
variables described in the next section are taken from the from the Heston-Summers-Aten 
(2006) dataset (Penn World Table 6.2).16  
                                                          
15 See Appendix 1 for a more detailed discussion about the filtering methods. 
16 See Appendix 2 for a detailed description of all the variables and their availability.  
18
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4.2. Results and Discussion 
In Table 3 we report the estimates of the effect of general government total revenue, both 
in terms of GDP’s share and volatility, on output growth (using the HP filter for annual 
data with the smoothness parameter, , equal to 6.25). The results suggest that revenues-
to-GDP seem to impinge negatively on the real growth of per capita GDP both for the 
OECD and the EU countries. In particular, a percentage point increase in the share of total 
revenue in GDP would decrease output growth by 0.12 percentage points both for the 
OECD and the EU countries. In contrast, revenue volatility does not seem to significantly 
affect growth.17 In addition, it seems that effect of government revenues ratios squared 
does not depend on the relative size of government. 
[Insert Table 3] 
 
Similar implications emerge from analysing the effect of general government total 
spending. In Table 4 we report the estimates of the effect of total spending, both in terms 
of GDP’s share and volatility, on output growth. As in the case for total revenue, countries 
with a higher share of expenditure in GDP tend to grow more slowly. In particular, for the 
OECD (EU) countries an increase of one percentage point in the share of total expenditure 
to GDP would decrease growth by 0.13 (0.09) percentage points. The magnitude of the 
coefficient is almost identical in absolute terms to the effect of total investment on growth. 
Again, the effect of government spending ratios squared does not seem to depend on the 
relative size of government.  
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
                                                          
17 The effect of the control variables is generally significant (except for the dummies EMU and SM), and 
their sign is consistent with the one expected. 
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A different pattern emerges in terms of spending volatility. While it has no effect on 
growth for the OECD countries, it has a negative and significant effect for the EU 
countries. For these countries in particular, an increase of one percent in spending 
volatility (on average) would decrease growth by 0.76 percentage points.18    
 
Analysing the effect of each component of general government revenue on growth (Table 
5), we can see that both indirect taxes and social contributions as a percentage of GDP 
have a negative effect on growth for both the OECD and the EU countries. In particular, 
while an increase of one percentage point in indirect taxes ratio lowers growth by 0.30 
(0.40) percentage points for the OECD (EU) countries, an increase of the same magnitude 
in social contributions ratio decreases growth by 0.34 (0.38) percentage points for the 
OECD (EU) countries. Thus, it seems that while for the OECD countries social 
contributions are more detrimental to growth, for the EU countries indirect taxes are more 
harmful. In contrast, direct taxes and size do not seem to affect growth significantly for 
either set of countries.19 This could suggest that direct taxes (such as income taxes) are less 
distortionary than indirect taxes (such as VAT, sales taxes, goods and services taxes) and 
social contributions. 
[Insert Table 5] 
 
In terms of volatility it emerges that while the volatility of indirect taxes negatively affects 
growth in the OECD sample, the volatility of social contributions has a negative impact on 
growth for the EU country sample. In particular, a one percent increase in indirect taxes 
                                                          
18 The effect on growth is computed by multiplying the estimated coefficient for the average volatility with 
the average volatility (see Table 2). Values in the text and those obtained by multiplication may differ due to 
rounding . 
19 One has to notice that we are examining average tax burden and not marginal tax burden. 
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volatility (social contribution) lowers growth for the OECD (EU) countries by 0.07 (0.27) 
percentage points. 
 
Repeating the same analysis for the main components of general government expenditure, 
we can observe that for both sets of countries, subsidies and government consumption as a 
percentage of GDP have a significant negative impact on growth.20 This negative effect 
could be explained by the fact that subsidies could provide in some cases did-incentives 
and be distortionary. From columns one and three in Table 6, it is possible to see that while 
an increase of one percentage point in subsidies lowers growth by 0.44 (0.71) percentage 
points in the OECD (EU) countries, an increase of one percentage point in government 
consumption decreases growth by 0.23 (0.31). Thus, although the effect is more 
pronounced in the EU countries, subsidies seem to be more detrimental to growth than 
government consumption. Moreover, in the OECD countries, although government 
consumption hampers growth, it seems to have a less negative effect for countries with 
relatively bigger governments.21 However, this improvement is quite negligible in terms of 
magnitude, with the result that even for these countries government consumption is 
detrimental to growth. In contrast, while government investment does not seem to affect 
growth significantly for both sets of countries, transfers have a positive and significant 
effect for the EU countries. 
[Insert Table 6] 
 
In terms of volatility, while all the measures of spending volatility generally do not have a 
significant effect in the OECD countries, both government consumption and investment 
                                                          
20 One should be aware that there could be reverse causality between growth and subisidies, in the sense that 
in a situation of lower growth governments may choose to increase the amount of subsidies given. 
21 This could be partially explained by the fact that among these countries there are transition economies 
such as the Czech Republic and Hungary where government consumption could have helped in the initial 
restructuring process of the economy.  
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volatility have a negative and statistically significant effect on growth in the EU countries.  
For this set of countries in particular, an increase of one percent in government 
consumption (investment) volatility lowers growth by 0.41 (0.46) percentage points.This 
could be explained by the fact, that higher government consumption and investment 
volatility will enchance macroeconomic uncertainty, reducing thereby growth and private 
investment, also through an upward effect on the interest rate (Ayagari et al. 1992). 
 
Splitting government consumption into wage and non-wage components, both variables as 
a percentage of GDP turn out to affect growth negatively for both sets of countries (Table 
7). However, while in the OECD countries the magnitude of these effects is quite similar, 
in the EU countries non-wage components of government consumption seem to be more 
detrimental, and this result persists when we consider volatility measures. Moreover, in the 
EU countries the negative effect of wages is less relevant for those countries where the 
government wage share is higher than 18 percent.22 However, this size effect is very 
modest, with the result that also for these countries government wage is detrimental to 
growth. 
[Insert Table 7] 
 
4.3. Robustness Analysis 
A relevant issue when specifying a panel growth equation is whether or not to include 
country dummies. While the inclusion of country specific effects has the advantage of 
controlling for unobserved country heterogeneity, it could lead to misleading conclusion in 
the analysis of the results. In fact, it has to be kept in mind that the fixed effect estimator is 
equivalent to the OLS estimator after applying the “within” transformation. Therefore, 
                                                          
22 The variable GWAGE2 is not significant when we drop all the observations with government wage share 
higher than 18%. These countries are: Belgium (1970-1974), Denmark (1980-1984) and Sweden (1975-
1979, 1980-1984).  
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what is measured empirically is the deviation from country averages and not the long-run 
growth effect.  
 
In order to control for possible misspecification due to the inclusion of country dummies, 
we re-estimate equations (1) and (2) using only time dummies. Analyzing the results 
reported in Table 8, it clearly emerges that they are also robust when we exclude country 
specific fixed effects. In particular, as we have mentioned in the previous section, the 
effect of general government total revenue and expenditure in term’s of GDP’s share and 
volatility (for the expenditure variable) are detrimental for growth in both the OECD and 
in the EU set of countries. 
[Insert Table 8] 
 
A second concern regarding our econometric specification is the possible reverse causality 
between growth and government size and growth and fiscal volatility. Regarding the first 
issue, one should bear in mind that if the elasticities of government spending and taxation 
with respect to output variations are less than 1 (which seems reasonable), then a five-year 
period of fast growth will determine a decrease of the ratios E/Y and R/Y. Thus, in order to 
control for a possible endogeneity problem in our regression, we have re-estimated 
equations (1) and (2) using only the initial level of government spending and revenue-to-
GDP ratios, in other words, the shares for the first year of each of the 5-year periods (see 
Table 9).  
[Insert Table 9] 
 
Similarly to this point, the direction of causality between fiscal volatility and growth in the 
simple OLS estimation is not very clear. Even if control variables as output volatility, 
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initial level of GDP, and time and country effects can account for simultaneity, in the case 
of both fiscal volatility and growth they are determined by the same set of explanatory 
variables. Therefore, in addition to the initial level of government and expenditure ratios, 
we also used the one lag value for our measure of fiscal volatility ( 1
R  and 1
E ). Again, the 
results are robust to these different specifications. Moreover, using the one lagged 
measures of fiscal volatility, it comes out that also government total revenue volatility (in 
addition to expenditure volatility) is detrimental for growth. 
 
5. Conclusion
Over the last three decades until the mid-1990s there has been a significant expansion of 
government participation in the economy in all industrialized countries. Regarding this 
point, many studies have claimed that restrictions on fiscal policy could be favourable to 
growth. In fact, from a theoretical point of view, government size is likely to be 
detrimental to economic growth, for instance, due to inefficiency of government activities, 
while government volatility is likely to increase macroeconomic uncertainty. Thus, in 
order to understand how to restrict fiscal policy volatility and limit government size, it is 
quite relevant to assess which components of general government spending and revenue 
(both in terms of size and volatility) have a negative effect on growth.  
 
Therefore, in this paper we examined the effect of government size and fiscal volatility on 
growth for a set of OECD and EU countries. The overall results suggest that both 
dimensions tend to hamper growth in both country samples. Total revenue and total 
expenditure seem to impinge negatively on the real growth of per capita GDP both for the 
OECD and the EU countries. In particular, a percentage point increase in the share of total 
revenue (total expenditure) would decrease output by 0.12 and 0.13 percentage points 
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respectively for the OECD and for the EU countries. It is worthwhile mentioning that the 
magnitude of the effect is almost identical in absolute terms to the effect of total 
investment (private and public) share on growth. Moreover, total expenditure volatility 
also has a negative and statistically significant effect on growth, at least for the EU 
countries. 
 
Breaking up total revenue into direct taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions, our 
results suggest that among total revenue the variables that are most detrimental to growth, 
both in terms of size and volatility, are indirect taxes and social contributions. At the same 
time, analysing the components of total spending (transfers, subsidies, government 
consumption and government investment) the results suggest that, while for both set of 
countries both subsidies and government consumption have a significantly negative impact 
on growth, government investment does not significantly affect growth, and transfers have 
a positive and significant effect only for the EU countries. Moreover, for the EU countries, 
public consumption and investment volatility have a sizeable, negative and statistically 
significant effect on growth. These results are also in line with some available related 
empirical evidence pointing to the negative effects on growth of public spending, 
particularly in the case of developed countries.23 
 
There are relevant policy implications to be drawn from these results. It seems that revenue 
reductions that occur mainly in terms of indirect taxes and social contributions, and cuts in 
government consumption and subsidies may contribute positively to fostering economic 
growth in the country samples analysed. Moreover, public capital formation may indeed 
turn out to be less productive if devoted to inefficient projects, or if it crowds out private 
                                                          
23 For instance, de Ávila and Strauch (2003), in a panel framework, report that government consumption and 
transfers are detrimental for growth in the EU, while Fölster and Henrekson (2002) also conclude that there 
is a negative relationship between government expenditure and growth. 
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investment.24 These conclusions also provide useful indications to policy makers when 
deciding which components of public finances to adjust (namely by redirecting spending 
towards more growth enhancing activities, in a context of limited public resources and 
fiscal constraints). 
 
Finally, regarding possible further empirical research, one could envisage looking more 
closely at the optimal size and the nature of the relationship between the role of the various 
components of government spending and revenue and growth. 
                                                          
24 Afonso and St. Aubyn (2007) report that crowding-in effects of public investment on private investment 
can vary considerably across countries. 
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Appendix 1 – Cyclical Volatility 
Business cycle measures are obtained by detrending the series of real GDP, and of real 
government expenditure and revenue items. Four different methods are used to detrend the 
series of each country i and estimate its cyclical component. Letting titi Yy ,, ln , the first 
measure is simple differencing (growth rate): 
     1,,, tititi yyc .                                              (A1) 
The second and the third method use the Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, proposed by 
Hodrick and Prescott (1997). The filter decomposes the series into a cyclical tic ,  and a 
trend tig ,  component, by minimizing with respect to tig , , for the smoothness 













,, .                                    (A2) 
The methods differ because the second one consists of using the value recommended by 
Hodrick and Prescott for annual data for the smoothness parameter ( ) equal to 100, while 
the third method considers the smoothness parameter ( ) to be equal to 6.25. In this way, 
as pointed out by Ravn and Uhlig (2002), the Hodrick-Prescott filter produces cyclical 
components comparable to those obtained by the Band-Pass filter. 
The fourth method makes use of the Band-Pass (BP) filter proposed by Baxter and King 
(1999), and evaluated by Stock and Watson (1999) and Christiano and Fitzgerald (2003) 
(who also compare its properties to those of the HP filter). The Low-Pass (LP) filter )(L , 
which forms the basis for the band pass filter, selects a finite number of moving average 
weights h  to minimize: 








hK e)( .   
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The LP filter uses )(K  to approximate the infinite MA filter )( . Defining 
)()()( , and then minimizing Q, we minimize the discrepancy between the 
ideal LP filter )(  and its finite representation )(K  at frequency . The main 
objective of the BP filter as implemented by Baxter and King (1999) is to remove both the 
high frequency and low frequency components of a series, leaving the business-cycle 
frequencies. This is obtained by subtracting the weights of two low pass filters. We define 
L  and H , the lower and upper frequencies of two low pass filters, as eight and two 
respectively for annual data. We therefore remove all fluctuations shorter than two or 
longer than eight years. The frequency representation of the band pass weights becomes 
)()( LKHK , and forms the basis of the Baxter-King filter, which provides an 
alternative estimate of the trend and the cyclical component. 
 
The four filters yield substantially similar results, with only minor differences 
(differencing generally produces the most volatile series, while the HP6.25 the smoothest).  
For example, analysing the effect of total expenditure volatility on growth for the EU 
countries (results of the third column in Table 3), we can see that the effect is negative and 
significant for all filtering methods. Moreover, as suggested also by Ravn and Uhlig 
(2002), the choice of the HP6.25 seems to be the most sensible for annual data. In fact, and 
for the EU country sample for instance, the associated effect is very close to the average of 
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Table A1 - Robustness Check (EU) 
HP6.25 HP100 Diff BP 
E -46.337*** -50.119*** -20.426** -31.683*** 
(-2.74) (-3.31) (-2.13) (-2.31) 
Average volatility 0.017 0.023 0.0269 0.018 
Effect -0.765 -1.134 -0.550 -0.556 
 
    Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis. 




Appendix 2 – Data Sources 
Initial Output (Yo) - The log of Heston-Summers-Aten (2006) variable “Real GDP per 
capita at the beginning of each time period, 2000 international prices; Laspeyres index”. 
 
Growth-rate (g) - The five-year average of the Heston-Summers-Aten (2006) annual 
growth rate variable. 
 
Population Growth (n) - The average of the annual log difference of Heston-Summers-
Aten (2006) population variable. 
 
Investment Share of GDP (I/Y) - Heston-Summers-Aten (2006) variable “Real Gross 
Domestic Investment, private and public, % Real GDP per capita, 2000 international 
prices”. 
 
Human Capital (h) - Barro-Lee (2001) variable “Average schooling years in the total 
population over age 25 at the beginning of each time period”. 
 
Openness (OPEN) - Heston-Summers-Aten (2006) variable “Exports plus Imports divided 
by Real GDP”. 
 
Total Revenue (R), Direct Taxes (DIR), Indirect Taxes (IND), Social Contributions (SOC), 
Total Expenditure (E), Government Consumption (GCON), Government Investment 
(GINV), Transfers (TRA), Subsidies (SUB), Government Wages (W), GDP, GDP Deflator. 
Source: OECD Economic Outlook, current prices.
 
Non-Wage Components of Government Consumption (NW). Source: OECD Economic 
Outlook and author calculations, current prices. 
See the OECD Economic Outlook: Sources and Manual, for details on the definition and 
construction of the variables.
33
ECB
Working Paper Series No 849
January 2008
 
Table A2 – Data Availability 
Y n h I/Y OPEN R DIR IND SOC E GCON GINV TRA SUB W NW 
Australia 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 - - 
Austria 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Belgium 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 85 70 70 70 
Canada 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Czech Republic 90 70 90 90 90 92 93 93 93 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 
Denmark 70 70 70 70 70 71 71 71 71 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Finland 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
France 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Germany 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Greece 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Hungary 70 70 70 70 70 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 
Iceland 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Ireland 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Italy 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Japan 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Korea 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Luxembourg 70 70 70 70 70 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 
Netherlands 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
New Zealand 70 70 70 70 70 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 86 
Norway 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Poland 70 70 70 70 70 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 95 
Portugal 70 70 70 70 70 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 77 
Slovakia 86 70 90 86 87 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 94 
Spain 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Sweden 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Switzerland 70 70 70 70 70 90 90 90 90 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
United Kingdom 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
United States 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 
Note: In the table we report the first year of data availability for each variable. 
Table A3 – Correlation Matrix for Fiscal Variables 
R DIR IND SOC E GCON GINV TRA SUB W NW 
R 1           
DIR 0.67 1          
IND 0.51 0.25 1         
SOC 0.40 -0.23 -0.15 1        
E 0.91 0.54 0.43 0.48 1       
GCON 0.84 0.59 0.50 0.29 0.86 1      
GINV -0.30 -0.34 -0.06 -0.11 -0.34 -0.24 1     
TRA 0.72 0.40 0.41 0.25 0.60 0.47 -0.13 1    
SUB 0.36 0.08 0.41 0.14 0.35 0.22 0.09 0.31 1   
W 0.75 0.67 0.47 0.04 0.70 0.82 -0.22 0.44 0.29 1  












Table 1 – Total public expenditure as a % of GDP 
(General government)  
 
Change in pp 
 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 05-70 05-95 
Australia 25.9 31.7 33.2 39.7 35.7 38.3 34.8 34.9 9.0 -3.4 
Austria 39.7 46.2 49.4 53.0 51.5 56.0 51.4 49.9 10.2 -6.1 
Belgium 41.0 48.9 54.7 58.3 52.2 51.9 49.0 49.8 8.8 -2.1 
Canada 36.0 41.1 41.6 48.3 48.8 48.5 41.1 39.3 3.2 -9.2 
Czech Republic .. .. .. .. .. 54.0 41.7 43.6 .. -10.3 
Denmark .. 46.5 53.6 55.8 55.9 59.5 53.9 52.8 .. -6.7 
Finland 30.9 38.5 40.1 46.4 48.0 61.5 48.3 50.1 19.2 -11.4 
France 39.2 43.8 45.6 51.0 49.4 54.4 51.6 53.9 14.7 -0.6 
Germany 38.4 48.7 46.9 45.1 43.6 48.3 45.1 46.8 8.4 -1.5 
Greece 26.5 30.2 32.1 45.1 49.2 50.1 51.2 46.7 20.1 -3.5 
Hungary .. .. .. .. .. 55.4 46.6 49.9 .. -5.5 
Iceland 31.1 37.5 35.7 38.0 41.5 42.7 42.1 43.4 12.3 0.7 
Ireland 44.8 49.0 54.6 54.2 43.1 41.3 31.6 34.1 -10.7 -7.1 
Italy 32.5 39.3 40.8 49.8 52.9 52.5 46.1 48.2 15.8 -4.2 
Japan 20.8 27.4 32.1 32.1 31.8 36.5 39.2 37.0 16.2 0.5 
Korea . .. 18.7 21.2 20.0 20.0 20.8 23.9 29.1 .. 8.2 
Luxembourg .. .. .. .. 37.7 39.7 37.6 43.2 .. 3.5 
Netherlands 43.7 50.5 54.2 55.7 52.9 50.0 44.0 45.5 1.7 -4.6 
New Zealand .. .. .. .. 53.2 42.0 39.6 38.2 .. -3.8 
Norway 39.1 43.3 46.1 44.0 54.0 51.5 42.7 42.8 3.7 -8.7 
Poland .. .. .. .. .. 47.7 41.0 42.7 .. -5.0 
Portugal .. .. 34.2 39.3 40.3 43.1 43.1 47.7 .. 4.7 
Slovakia .. .. .. .. .. 47.0 51.7 37.1 .. -9.9 
Spain 23.0 25.7 33.5 42.3 42.6 44.2 39.0 38.2 15.2 -6.0 
Sweden 43.9 47.4 64.1 64.8 61.3 67.1 56.8 56.3 12.4 -10.8 
Switzerland . . . . 30.0 34.5 33.9 36.2 .. 1.6 
United Kingdom 42.0 49.8 46.4 47.4 42.4 44.9 37.5 44.9 2.8 -0.1 
United States 32.3 33.3 34.3 35.3 36.3 37.3 38.3 39.3 7.0 2.0 
Minimum 20.8 18.7 21.2 20.0 20.0 20.8 23.9 29.1 8.3 8.2 
Maximum 44.8 50.5 64.1 64.8 61.3 67.1 56.8 56.3 11.5 -10.8 
Simple average 35.0 39.9 42.6 46.0 44.8 47.3 43.1 43.8 9.1 -3.5 
        Source: OECD (complemented with AMECO and National Bank of Belgium data). 
 
Table 2 – Average volatility for Output and Fiscal Variables (HP 6.25) 
EU OECD 
Output 0.014 0.015 
Total spending 0.017 0.054 
Total revenue 0.017 0.054 
Transfers 0.030 0.062 
Subsidies 0.071 0.132 
Government consumption 0.016 0.078 
Government investment 0.057 0.106 
Gov. cons. wages 0.016 0.050 
Gov. cons. non-wage 0.026 0.055 
Direct taxes 0.037 0.070 
Indirect taxes 0.027 0.084 
Social contributions 0.026 0.070 
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Table 3 – Total General Government Revenue and Growth  
(including country and period dummies) 
 
OECD EU 
0Y -4.541*** -4.196*** -3.002 -2.669 
(-4.22) (-3.73) (-1.33) (-1.15) 
Y -3.302 -8.434 29.987 21.393 
 (-0.23) (-0.56) (1.02) (0.67) 
I/Y 0.130*** 0.136*** 0.102 0.105 
 (3.14) (3.26) (1.24) (1.28) 
OPEN 3.098*** 3.254*** 4.543** 4.767** 
 (3.09) (3.21) (2.42) (2.55) 
N -49.082 -68.211 -62.885 -81.559 
 (-1.16) (-1.48) (-0.91) (-1.07) 
H 0.581** 0.539** 0.451* 0.425* 
 (2.62) (2.39) (1.8) (1.62) 
FIN -3.987*** -4.058*** -4.402*** -4.440*** 
 (-3.25) (-3.30) (-4.87) (-4.92) 
GER 0.965 1.063 1.067* 1.137* 
 (0.82) (0.90) (1.80) (1.87) 
SM 0.459 0.406 -0.878 -0.985 
 (1.23) (1.08) (-0.95) (-1.06) 














 (-0.83) (-0.79) (-0.63) (-0.63) 
R/Y -0.122*** -0.269* -0.117*** -0.259 
 (-3.43) (-1.88) (-2.97) (-1.51) 
 (R/Y)2  0.002  0.002 
  (1.06)  (0.92) 






  (0.63) (0.65) (-1.44) (-1.42) 
No. obs.  159 159 95 95 
R-square  0.74 0.74 0.72 0.72 
Adj. R-square  0.64 0.64 0.59 0.59 
 
 Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
*, **, *** - Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
FIN – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the period 1990. 
GER – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the period 1991. 
SM – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 after year 1991 for the EU15 countries.  
EMU– dummy variable that assumes the value 1 after year 1998 for the EMU countries. 
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Table 4 – Total General Government Expenditure and Growth 
(including country and period dummies) 
  OECD EU 
0Y  -5.399*** -5.103*** -4.210** -4.017** 
 (-5.17) (-4.85) (-2.20) (-2.16) 
Y -5.028 -10.572 29.422 17.701 
 (-0.27) (-0.77) (1.04) (0.54) 
I/Y 0.115*** 0.113*** 0.056 0.056 
 (2.91) (2.89) (0.78) (0.79) 
OPEN 2.988*** 3.109*** 4.348*** 4.735** 
 (3.16) (3.30) (2.61) (2.86) 
N -68.675* -88.000** -38.436 -61.258 
 (-1.70) (-2.10) (-0.61) (-0.83) 
H 0.672*** 0.658** 0.293 0.302 
 (3.17) (3.12) (1.19) (1.20) 
FIN -3.398 *** -3.505*** -4.303*** -4.289*** 
 (-2.89) (-3.00) (-5.02) (-4.82) 
GER 0.830 0.962 0.903* 1.017* 
 (0.74) (0.86) (1.80) (1.91) 
SM 0.486 0.407 1.626 -0.581 
 (1.38) (1.15) (1.47) (-0.38) 
















    (-0.94) (-0.96) (-0.46) (-0.57) 
E/Y -0.130*** -0.304*** -0.085** -0.270** 
 (-5.12) (-2.78) (-2.39) (-1.96) 
(E/Y)2  0.002*  0.002 
  (1.63)  (1.46) 






  (0.53) (0. 54) (-2.74) (-2.63) 
No. obs.  159 159 95 95 
R-square  0.77 0.77 0.77 0.77 
Adj. R-square   0.68 0.68 0.66 0.66 
 Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
*, **, *** - Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
FIN – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the period 1990. 
GER – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the period 1991. 
SM – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 after year 1991 for the EU15 countries. 
EMU– dummy variable that assumes the value 1 after year 1999 for the EMU countries. 
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Table 5 – General Government Revenue Composition and Growth  
(including country and period dummies) 
  OECD EU 
Controls  n.r.  n.r.  n.r. n.r. 
DIR -0.039 -0.101 0.095 0.124 
 (-0.80) (-0.08) (1.27) (0.68) 
DIR2  0.002  -0.001 
  (0.52)  (-0.16) 
IND -0.297*** -0.126 -0.404*** 0.117 
 (-3.80) (-0.35) (-3.13) (0.21) 
IND2  -0.006  -0.022 
  (-0.46)  (-1.08) 
SOC -0.338** -0.687*** -0.382*** -0.570* 
 (-3.77) (-2.71) (-3.20) (-1.88) 
SOC2  0.014*  0.007 
  (1.66)  (0.75) 
DIR 4.209 5.015 0.636 0.333 
(1.25) (1.42) (0.12) (0.06) 
IND -0.821*** -0.795*** -10.816 -11.070 
(-4.81) (-4.62) (-1.12) (-1.13) 
SOC -2.944 -3.782 -10.552** -8.918 
Revenue 
variables 
(-0.86) (-1.05) (-2.14) (-1.53) 
No. obs. 153 153 95 95 
R-square 0.80 0.81 0.78 0.79 
Adj. R-square 0.72 0.72 0.66 0.65 
 
Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
*, **, *** - Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
n.r. - not reported. Full results regarding these variables are available upon request. 
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Table 6 – General Government Expenditure Composition and Growth  
(including country and period dummies) 
 
OECD EU 
Controls  n.r.  n.r.  n.r. n.r. 
TRA 0.039 -0.831 0.386** -0.134 
 (0.20) (-1.14) (2.09) (-0.20) 
TRA2  0.083  0.053 
  (1.12)  (0.71) 
SUB -0.438** -0.868* -0.708*** -1.062* 
 (-2.24) (-1.83) (-3.84) (-1.69) 
SUB2  0.106  0.082* 
  (0.94)  (0.50) 
GCON -0.227*** -0.943*** -0.313*** -0.719** 
 (-2.61) (-2.91) (-4.41) (-2.46) 
GCON2  0.020**  0.011 
  (2.47)  (1.50) 
GINV -0.019 -0.141 -0.164 0.277 
 (-0.10) (-024) (-0.74) (0.46) 
GINV2  0.040  -0.048 
  (0.47)  (-0.54) 
TRA  1.467* 1.059 -5.215 -6.334 
 (1.89) (1.55) (-1.11) (-1.22) 
SUB  -0.370 0.706 -2.193 -1.946 
 (-0.17) (0.32) (-0.89) (-0.69) 
GCON  1.558 1.529 -26.343** -24.993* 
 (0.46) (0.36) (-2.14) (-1.89) 















    (-0.62) (-0.76) (-1.74) (-1.96) 
No. obs.  148 148 85 85 
R-square  0.77 0.79 0.87 0.89 
Adj. R-square  0.66 0.67 0.79 0.79 
 
Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
*, **, *** - Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
n.r. - not reported. Full results regarding these variables are available upon request. 
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Table 7 – General Government Expenditure Composition (wage and non-wage 
disaggregation) and Growth (including country and period dummies) 
 
OECD EU 
 Controls  n.r. n.r. n.r. n.r. 
TRA -0.192 -1.022 0.302 -0.060 
 (-0.09) (-1.37) (1.35) (-0.09) 
TRA2  0.101  0.044 
  (1.33)  (0.56) 
SUB -0.415** -0.971** -0.727*** -.0.686 
 (-2.07) (-2.15) (-3.73) (-0.96) 
SUB2  0.102  -0.022 
  (0.93)  (-0.13) 
GWAGE -0.256** -1.679*** -0.318*** -1.534*** 
 (-2.56) (-3.78) (-3.17) (-2.99) 
GWAGE2  0.060***  0.042** 
  (3.42)  (2.44) 
GNONWAGE -0.252* -0.211 -0.429** 0.307 
 (-1.87) (-0.42) (-2.42) (0.57) 
GNONWAGE2  -0.001  -0.042 
  (-0.04)  (-1.43) 
GINV 0.048 0.436 -0.141 0.829 
 (0.25) (0.66) (-0.63) (1.13) 
GINV2  -0.035  -0.116 
  (-0.36)  (-1.16) 
TRA  -0.655 -1.747 -7.740 -6.759 
 (-0.14) (-0.36) (-1.53) (-1.17) 
SUB  -0.595 -0.329 -3.070 -3.172 
 (-0.28) (-0.16) (-1.25) (-1.26) 
GWAGE  1.851 2.624 -3.070 -5.209 
 (0.47) (0.66) (-0.22) (-0.39) 
GNONWAGE -0.010 0.019 -16.715* -11.705 
 (-0.09) (0.14) (-1.66) (-1.17) 

















  (-0.24) (-0.39) (-1.52) (-1.22) 
No. obs.  141 141 85 85 
R-square  0.78 0.82 0.88 0.89 
Adj. R-square  0.66 0.71 0.78 0.79 
      
Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
*, **, *** - Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
n.r. - not reported. Full results regarding these variables are available upon request. 
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Table 8 – Total General Government Expenditure and Revenue and Growth  
(Including Only Period Dummies) 
 
OECD EU 
0Y -1.609*** -1.509*** -1.067 -1.895** 
(-4.02) (-4.13) (-1.24) (-2.37) 
Y 5.931 1.767 49.467** 47.587 
 (0.42) (0.13) (2.02) (2.12) 
I/Y 0.104*** 0.0655*** 0.044 0.005 
 (4.28) (2.62) (1.04) (0.12) 
OPEN 2.965*** 3.427*** 3.662** 4.357*** 
 (3.06) (3.88) (2.51) (3.16) 
N 5.877 -16.657 -20.398 -22.869 
 (0.22) (-0.64) (-0.50) (-0.59) 
H 0.224*** 0.1.83*** 0.106 0.132 
 (3.06) (2.67) (0.81) (1.17) 
FIN -4.580*** -4.132*** -5.006*** -4.829*** 
 (-3.45) (-3.27) (-3.77) (-3.90) 
GER 0.364 0.384 0.954 0.754 
 (0.29) (0.32) (0.78) (0.67) 
SM 1.239*** 1.203*** 1.888** 1.660** 
 (3.78) (3.87) (2.26) (2.15) 














 (-0.07) (-0.33) (-0.61) (-0.64) 
R/Y -0.053***  -0.055**  
 (-3.06)  (-2.10)  
R 0.028  -10.043  
 (0.012)  (-0.70)  
 E/Y  -0.081***  -0.067*** 
  (-5.03)  (-2.94) 






   (0.16)  (-2.46) 
No. obs.  159 159 95 95 
R-square  0.57 0.61 0.60 0.66 
Adj. R-square  0.51 0.56 0.51 0.58 
 
 Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
*, **, *** - Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
FIN – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the period 1990. 
GER – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the period 1991. 
SM – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 after year 1991 for the EU15 countries.  
EMU– dummy variable that assumes the value 1 after year 1998 for the EMU countries 





















Table 9 – Total General Government Expenditure and Revenue and Growth, Robustness 
Check for Endogeneity (including country and period dummies) 
 
OECD EU 
0Y -2.216*** -2.596*** -0.644 -5.477*** 
(-2.22) (-3.46) (-0.38) (-3.53) 
Y -25.487 -20.957 14.482** 35.471 
 (-1.47) (-1.28) (0.46) (1.18) 
I/Y 0.148*** 0.110** 0.143* 0.132 
 (2.88) (2.23) (1.80) (1.64) 
OPEN 4.174* 6.728*** 10.516** 0.554 
 (1.82) (4.24) (2.07) (0.16) 
N -50.103 -47.595 -79.333 -33.850 
 (-1.10) (-1.15) (-1.36) (-0.58) 
H 0.893*** 0.553*** 0.313 0.632*** 
 (3.54) (4.22) (1.21) (2.72) 
FIN -4.497*** -4.422*** -4.682*** -5.073*** 
 (-3.68) (-3.70) (-3.36) (-3.60) 
GER 0.427 0.734 0.921 1.072 
 (0.36) (0.64) (0.78) (0.83) 
SM 1.276*** 0.839** 1.023 2.085** 
 (3.34) (2.29) (1.03) (2.40) 














 (-0.67) (-0.01) (-0.03) (0.50) 
R/Y0 -0.071**  -0.079**  
 (-2.14)  (-2.31)  
1
R  -23.662**  -23.556  
 (-2.02)  (-1.44)  
 E/Y0  -0.068***  -0.064** 
  (-3.16)  (-1.99) 
1
E  






   (-2.81)  (-1.75) 
No. obs.  159 159 95 95 
R-square  0.57 0.61 0.60 0.66 
Adj. R-square  0.51 0.56 0.51 0.58 
 
 Notes: t-statistics are in parenthesis. Robust standard errors to control for heteroscedasticity. 
*, **, *** - Statistically significant at the 10, 5, and 1 percent level respectively. 
FIN – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the period 1990. 
GER – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 for the period 1991. 
SM – dummy variable that assumes the value 1 after year 1991 for the EU15 countries.  
EMU– dummy variable that assumes the value 1 after year 1998 for the EMU countries 
The HP6.25 filter was used to decompose the series. 
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